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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Problems of Criminality.—I. “Is there a law of the transformations of the notion of crime?” It is a question not of real transformations of morality and of criminality, but of changes in the *notion* of morality and crime. The difference between the notion of crime held by our earliest known ancestors and that of more modern times is not so great as at first appears. The Ossetes of the Caucasus preserve better than any other existing people of Aryan origin the primitive institutions. Accepting the generalizations to which a study of this people leads, it seems to result that “among all ancient nations living in the state of the clan and the tribe, and even in the first epoch of city organization, crime was conceived: (1) not as an individual act, reproachable to the author alone, but as a collective deed, imputable to a whole collection of individuals; (2) not as the voluntary violation of a law, but as a simple material injury, no matter whether voluntary or involuntary.” But the offenses which give rise to vengeance, crimes with respect to which no distinction is made between the author and his relatives, between the voluntary and the accidental, are not true crimes; they are deeds of war, accidents of the chase, committed to the injury of a man or a group of men, to be sure, but outside of the social group of which the author of the injury is a member, and outside of which there was primitively no relation of duty or of right recognized. The obligations of clan to clan long remained fragile, and their violation aroused only alarm on the material side.

But besides these pseudo-crimes, which became true crimes only with the lapse of time by the superposition of the city upon the clan, by the enlargement of the social circle, there was from the beginning a category of true crimes, committed between relatives, within the family or clan. These were under the jurisdiction of the domestic tribunal. Crimes committed within this sacred circle were imputable only to their author, and they were punishable only when they were intentional. Vengeance was not demanded under these conditions; society would be inimical to itself if it punished the death of one of its members by the death of another. Banishment was sometimes the lot of the guilty person, and if he escaped this penalty his lot was hardly more enviable; the public contempt into which he fell often drove him to voluntary exile. Thus there have existed, side by side, two vastly different species of punishment, the one inter-familial, the other intra-familial; one has not evolved from the other, but both have evolved independently and parallel. They have acted and reacted upon each other, and in a given time and place one or the other may have the ascendancy.

The punishment inflicted by the domestic tribunal, tinged with sympathy and mildness, was gradually assumed by royal, imperial, or national tribunals; and as the royal judge often treated the offenders as enemies rather than as rebellious sons to be brought back to the fold, we find the element of vindictiveness again appearing. The notion of crime has remained the same, in its essentials, from the origin of societies. Yet it has been purified. The enlarging of the social circle has had for its effect to give to the notion of crime a meaning less and less particular and more and more general. Homicide, for example, has a larger social interest than formerly, one indication of it being the establishment of treaties of extradition.

II. “Is there a law of transformations undergone, not with respect to the notion itself of the crime, but with respect to the nature of the acts to which this notion has been successively attributed?”

Certain acts have always been considered as crimes; such, for example, are homicide and robbery committed against a member of the same social group. But this is not saying that these crimes have always been considered as major crimes. The greatest crime has always been that which has at once aroused the greatest alarm and the most lively indignation, that is, which has appeared most seriously to injure the lives and the interests of the collectivity, and to shock most severely the sentiments

born of beliefs. The question is, therefore, whether the causes which modify beliefs and desires succeed each other in a constant and irreversible order. There are certain constant tendencies: First, the social group tends always to enlarge, involving considerable changes in the mutual relations of the members of the group. In proportion as the internal population increases at the expense of the external population, the difference between the two, with reference to duty and crime, becomes attenuated. The larger a social group becomes, the more vague becomes its limits. The distinction between interior and exterior crime then becomes a mere shade. In the small and compact clan, surrounded by enemies and filled with superstition, the first duty is the solidarity of every member with the group, and piety toward the protecting deity. The first and most odious crimes are, therefore, treason and impiety. It was the same under the régime of the cities. When the era of empires came, it was not so much divine high treason as royal and imperial treason which constituted the greatest of crimes. The highest crimes were then political, while, at the present day, to say that a crime is political is to exonerate it. In the course of time the greatest duties became, not to obey an order, but to fulfill a contract, either tacit or formal; hence the greatest of crimes became the violation of a fundamental social convention, by force or by improbity. Homicide and robbery, always criminal, then became the most worthy of public censure.

When the group becomes so large that the members do not know each other, the bond of social fellowship becomes feeble and does not contrast so strongly as formerly with the absence of every moral bond in the relation of group to group. In modern civilized society it is only when we come in contact with much inferior races that we feel ourselves altogether morally irresponsible, and abuse our power. The need of colonization by civilized races is stimulated by the desire to treat the stranger as game, to enslave him, and to domesticate him after conquering him. Much active criminality, out of employment in Europe, finds a career in enterprises of this kind. Another criminal outlet open to the civilized is found in politics. When the greater part of the men included in the group-consciousness is unknown to us, a new personage appears, an impersonal personage, the public. In dealings with the public we wink at licenses that we would reproach severely in personal relations with acquaintances. Politics becomes civilized brigandage, enlarged and attenuated; colonization, too often, is brigandage exported and organized. Just as wars have become more destructive and murderous, though less malignant and ferocious, so crimes have gained in power of harm-doing what they have lost in spitefulness and atrocity.

To comprehend the transformations of criminality it is necessary to take into account two orders of considerations: (1) those which concern the successive enlargements of the social circle (which has been considered); (2) those which concern the interior changes which the social group has undergone in consequence of the accumulation of discoveries and inventions. New inventions and new beliefs give rise to new crimes. Political crimes, consisting in the propagation of sedition and revolt, have increased in power immensely by the development of means of communication. Formerly dependent on the voice of an orator or a preacher, they are now propagated by the press and through journals.

What are the qualitative and quantitative variations in criminality, brought about by the passage of a people from one stage of culture to another? M. de Candolle maintains that the greatest amount of criminality was to be found, not in savagery nor yet in civilization, but in barbarism. But there is not sufficient evidence of this. It is rather a change of conditions, a crisis of progress, which results in an increase of crime. As to the qualitative variations of criminality, in proportion as a people becomes civilized, that is, urbanized and industrialized, its criminality becomes less and less vindictive and violent, but more avaricious, more crafty, more voluptuous. In our own century, cupidity inspired 13 per cent. of the crimes from 1826-30, 22 per cent. from 1876-80, and 31.87 per cent. from 1891-5. Vindictive crimes decreased in the same proportion.—G. TARDE, "Problèmes de Criminalité," in *Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle*, July, 1898.

American Trusts.—A dozen years ago the American public suddenly awoke to the fact that the supply of some of the commodities of commonest use had come to

be controlled by a number of organizations which seemed to be able to fix prices without regard to competition. Two or three of the largest and most conspicuous had assumed the peculiar juridical form known as a "trust," a word which has continued to be commonly used for all capitalistic combinations of a supposed monopolistic tendency, whether they take that peculiar legal form or not. The discovery of their existence led to a popular demand that the several governments of the states and of the union should enforce what the lawyers declared to be the principles of the common law with regard to conspiracy in the restraint of trade. Anti-trust laws were passed by some twelve or more state legislatures; and in 1890 by the United States Congress itself with regard to interstate commerce. Although, in the new wave of business confidence, there is a fresh movement on the part of capitalists engaged in industry toward far-reaching and all-embracing combinations, there is not, in the original and exact sense of the word, a single "trust" in America. The "trust," properly so called, was nothing but an easy legal mechanism for arriving at an end which could equally well be achieved by other means. It was this: The shareholders of a number of joint-stock companies all handed over their stock, and with it their voting powers, to a small board of trustees, receiving in return certificates representing the amount deposited. Externally each company, or "corporation," retained its independent constitution; but henceforth its management was in the hands of the trustees, who acted nominally on behalf of the shareholders of that particular company, but really directed the operations of all the establishments according to a general plan. The attempt to enforce the supposed common law and the invention of new penalties in obedience to popular outcry have resulted in making it impossible for a number of companies or individuals to enter into formal contracts of certain particular kinds to restrict production and fix prices. What we have to look at, therefore, in the United States is not a particular form of association, but all such capitalistic monopolies—or (where the control of supply does not amount to a monopoly) all such market dominations—as are able so far to govern supply as to have the power of fixing prices without any immediate fear of competition, either domestic or (thanks to the tariff wall) foreign. There is a distinct tendency toward the extension either of combination or of more or less complete amalgamation of interests to more and more branches of industry, as well as toward the growing solidification of that increasing number of combinations which manage to survive. The student of the operation of the force of self-interest under modern conditions of production on a large scale can find no more instructive reading than the series of monographs which American economists and their pupils have devoted to the history of a number of the monopolized industries. The movement toward some mitigation of the influence of competition in the determination of price is very widespread in American industry, and is one of the chief directions in which the force of self-interest, which but recently made only for individualistic competition, is now making itself felt. The "trusts" represent but the culmination of this movement, which takes a hundred forms. The "great industry" of modern times, so long as it is carried on under conditions of individualistic competition, has certainly inevitable consequences of the gravest character. The tendency to periodical crises, due to a want of coincidence between supply and demand, is reinforced by the increasing use of fixed capital. The formation of "trusts" is, in the main, simply an attempt to lessen and, if it may be, avert altogether the disastrous and harassing effects of cut-throat competition. Their formation has, in most instances, followed upon a period of overproduction and consequent depression. The success of the combinations tends at present toward the creation of a régime of what the French call patronage. But the great captains of American industry are not all of them mere money grabbers. Many are in their way industrial statesmen. No large generalization as to the ultimate issue of industrial development can be made. In the case of the Standard Oil monopoly, the development has already reached a point at which, on the purely economic and administrative side, there could be little objection to the government taking over the business—if only there were a government politically capable of the task. In countries where the monopolizing movement is well under way the governments should assume the duty of, in some way, controlling prices. The principle of public determination of maximum rates and maximum dividends has already been recognized in various countries in various directions; and it will doubtless have to be carried farther. But, before this can be

done with any chance of tolerable success, any country which thinks of attempting it must provide itself with a fairly efficient administrative service. In view of contemporary conditions, two duties are incumbent upon the economist. One is the anticipation and formulation, by an effort of the economic imagination, of the sort of problems which are likely to arise in a society where prices generally are no longer determined by competition. The other is the duty of the economist to ascertain, for the guidance of the public, what the actual conditions are in his own country in the matter of industrial organization. — PROFESSOR W. J. ASHLEY, "American Trusts," in *Economic Journal*, June, 1899.

A Year of State Deficits.—One feature in public finance is remarkable because of its prevalence throughout the civilized world—the growing disparity between government revenue and expenditure. The situation raises the question of national revenue in a form other than has been recognized. Are the existing taxes failing to obtain revenue from the people, and must a new system be devised for enabling the governments to obtain what they need, even assuming there is no marked increase in the amount of expenditure? In the countries of southern Europe, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the existence of a deficit in the national budget has come to be regarded as something to be expected. Only a little above these countries in its fiscal character stands France. This people has long had the largest debt and the heaviest taxation per capita of any civilized power, and the inability to make the revenues meet the rapidly increasing expenditure has become greater each year.

Germany is in a better position, as increasing burdens can be shifted to the confederating states. No matter what the deficiencies in revenue from imperial taxation may be, it is made good by being quoted among the different states. That there should be a limit to this process is only natural, for a demand much heavier than usual would lead the states to ask whether the advantages of confederation were worth the money they required.

Austria-Hungary has been so disturbed in its domestic politics that its finances are in a greatly disordered condition. Even England faces a deficit after a long term of adequate revenue and a small surplus to be applied to the reduction of the debt. Believing that the command of the sea is essential to her very existence, Great Britain must maintain that command at any cost.

Outside of Europe, Japan is the country presenting the most interesting budget features. A recent report on the finances of that country contains a note of warning that is as applicable to the United States. "Financially Japan's military success over China seems likely to prove a heavy and constant burden." The outlay to which the country has pledged itself for productive and unproductive works to be carried through within the next ten years far surpasses 100,000,000 yen.

Australia, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, India, and Mexico tell much the same story of rising expenditures, increasing debts, and uncertain revenues. In the United States the daily returns show the increasing deficit, and the extravagance of the last session of Congress has become recognized. Russia is still juggling with her official budget statement, showing a surplus in the face of enormous taxation, crushing the life out of the people, and vast undertakings in Asia which may involve war and will certainly mean heavy expenditure. There is no immediate prospect of any halt in the demands made upon the governments for expenditures. The idea has become popular that the United States government must take the initiative in many costly undertakings, such as the Nicaraguan canal, the construction of a railroad the length of Cuba, the building up of a merchant marine through subsidies, and the encouragement of navigation interests by an extension of the navigation laws, giving a monopoly of the coastwise trade to American vessels. This policy is an extension to our new dependencies of the protective tariff policy so closely maintained at home. The United States, already suffering from a deficit, enters upon a career of development which involves an almost hopeless disparity between income and expenditure, so long as existing methods of obtaining national revenues are maintained.

After this survey of the leading nations of the world it is refreshing to turn to a country where the treasury is conducted so as to take as little as possible from the people. In Egypt the treasury flourishes, and debt and taxes have been brought to a

reasonable minimum, and the economy of the country is developed every year toward strength and independence. The Soudan has been reclaimed from barbarism, the fellah has become a peasant proprietor, and enjoys a commercial freedom and importance which would have been thought impossible less than twenty years ago. Egypt is in the position of a railroad in the hands of a receiver; its government must continue, but its finances are under a foreign control, and subject to the regulations of more than one power. Herein lies the whole problem. A people may spend freely on business principles in directions where the cost is returned many times over in public welfare. But politics or interested partisanship introduces an element that is ruinous to the public good and debauching to the public service.—W. C. FORD, "Year of State Deficits," in *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, March, 1899.

Fanaticism as a Source of Crime.—When belief, on its emotional side, rises to such a height as to interfere with the normal evolution of the psychic life, it becomes fanaticism. As phases of the development of such one-sidedness appear intense intolerance of the beliefs of others, and that degree of desire to save one's own soul which halts at no crime considered as a necessary means of reaching the end in view. It is in this phase of its growth that fanaticism becomes a source of crime. The results of an analysis of a series of legal actions involving prosecution for crime supposably committed under the spell of fanatical religious beliefs serve to illustrate this point. Thus, the Convulsionists, a sect existing in Paris about 1760, were wont to crucify members of their order, in emulation of the crucifixion of Jesus, in the belief that the souls of the surviving members would be saved by the sacrifice of their fellows. In 1817 the "Päschelians," an Austrian sect, murdered a man, his wife, and their daughter, under the delusion that the trio, who refused to go with the fanatics, were possessed of the devil. On the following day they crucified one of their own number, a girl of eighteen years, who had offered herself for the death, in imitation of the death of Jesus, in order to save the souls of her fellow-believers. In 1823 the leader of a Pietistic circle in Switzerland, after having dispatched her sister, who gave her life as a means of saving the souls of her relatives, was crucified by her followers at her own command, in order that she might die, rise again after three days, and restore to life the sister whom she had slain. In 1865 two mothers, adherents of the "Holy Men," slew their sick children, believing them to be victims of demoniacal possession. In 1875 a Hungarian miller, belonging to the "Nazarenes," killed his son as an offering for his own sins, after the fashion of Abraham. In 1870, in Irkutsch, Russia, one of the "Schismatics" convinced himself by prayer and fasting and much scripture-reading that to save his soul he must be crucified. Accordingly he attempted self-crucifixion, and succeeded so far as the circumstances of the case would permit. In 1830, in the government of Perm, Russia, a peasant killed his child as an offering for sin, and buried the body in an ant-hill. Likewise, in the government of Vladimir, another peasant killed both his children in due Abrahamic form, and while the babies bled under the father's knife the devout mother celebrated the service by reading aloud selected portions of the twenty-second chapter of Genesis. In 1854, in the government of Tamboff, Russia, a peasant, convinced that to save his soul a man must have a sin to repent of, killed a neighbor with an ax in order to satisfy this highly imperative condition. It is a part of the creed of the "Wanderers," a Russian sect, that Antichrist rules in high places there, and that, accordingly, good men must have naught to do with governmental affairs of any sort. In conformity with this belief, a man murdered, in various ingenious ways, twenty-five men, women, and children, including his own wife and babes, in order to free them from the danger of losing their souls by suffering the contaminating contact of the government census-taker. This occurred in 1897. The "Deniers," another quite interesting Russian sect, believe that evil taints all earthly good, and that the only escape is death. In 1825 sixty of these men, strong in the faith, after having murdered their wives and children, permitted themselves to be put to death, one by one, by their leader. The "Scourgers," who also form a widespread and influential sect in Russia, in obedience to the behests of their "saviors" are in the habit of indulging in human sacrifice, cannibalistic feasts, erotic dances, and other lewd procedures as an extremely efficacious method of keeping the hand of evil from off their immortal souls. So the "Muckers" of Königsberg

and the celebrants of the Black Mass in Paris afford further examples of the use of a ritual of eroticism, coupled with a practice of the most abandoned and obscene behavior, to promote the eternal welfare of the soul. A fitting conclusion to this series of instances cited in proof of the thesis that fanaticism may become a source of crime is afforded by the account of the notorious "Skopzi." A belief in the practice of castration as a necessary means of saving the soul is a cardinal tenet of their faith. The diabolical cunning and ingenuity displayed by them in accomplishing, with or without the victim's consent, this maiming operation upon young and old alike make them at once the most dangerous and the most despicable of criminals.—AUG. LOEWENSTEIN, "Der Fanatismus als Quelle der Verbrechen," in *Archiv f. Kriminal-Anthropologie u. Kriminalistik*, Band I, Heft 3.

The Present Organization of the English Factory Inspection.—Reference may be made to four principal points in which the organization of English factory inspection appears worthy of imitation: (1) Strict uniformity, combined with the principle of legalization of state officials; hence the greatest centralization of administration and decentralization of the work of inspection. (2) The far-reaching authority of inspectors; their independence of other authorities, and the consequent increased possibility of independent, powerful interference. (3) The range of requirements as respects qualification which admits the selection of forces from the most diverse classes of society and the most diverse vocations. (4) The appointment of trade physicians and their centralization. The number of officials, which is out of all proportion to the rapid increase of their obligations, is insufficient in England as elsewhere. Besides the trade physicians should be considered the sanitary inspection by men and women, which, however, is thorough only in a few places. The recent improvement in trade statistics shows more clearly than ever the lack of proportion between the number of officials and the great and increasing duties of the most diverse nature. Now as formerly, this lack of proportion between the work to be done and the workers is the most serious obstacle in the realization of the protection of workmen. This applies especially to non-factory laborers. It is just from these non-factory laborers, especially domestics, for whose legal protection thus far only weak attempts have been made in England, that the largest number of those three hundred thousand London families and the inhabitants of the slums of other great cities, which live on eighteen shillings a week, are recruited. The problem of poverty is most closely connected with the existence of this unorganized and uncared-for labor. The fight against the sweating system by means of protective ordinances adapted to its diverse elements on the basis of thorough investigation, and by trade inspection which in its organization and numerical strength shall correspond to some extent to its immense task, will probably be one of the most important factors in the struggle against the impoverization of the great mass of people whose life is in strange contrast to our civilization.—HELENE SIMON, "Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Organisation der englischen Fabrikinspektion," in *Jahrbuch, Schmoller*, 23. Jahrgang, Heft 2.

Democracy.—There are three distinct charges against it:

1. Democracy perverts the understanding by its aprioristic tendencies. It induces a sort of paralysis of the brain which neither permits men to see nor to comprehend facts as they present themselves in life. Men positively grow stupid. For the democrat all the terms of politics and philosophy change their meaning. Everything must converge toward the satisfaction of the masses. The only wrong is to allow oneself to be right against the people. They speak to us of justice, of equality, of liberty; their mouths are full of grandiloquent words, but these words are deformed by secret intentions and receive tacit meanings which are not found in the dictionaries. "Solidarity," *e. g.*, is simply a matter of extracting influence for the poor against the rich.

2. Democracy flatters itself to be a government of opinion, a principle altogether false. Even this principle it is neither able nor knows how to enforce. A government of opinion would be only a government of weathervanes. We do consult opinion in a certain way, but nothing is more contrary to common sense than that political direction is turned over to it. Opinion is only one factor in the political

problem; it is not the only principle. The development of the press has created a public whose influence cannot fail to be felt, but it is not a part of the despotic régime under which it acts. It is more curious, perhaps, that today, when the influence of democracy appears unlimited, when in principle its rule is absolute, its sentiments and desires are less respected than a hundred and fifty years ago. For democratic government has a philosophical program, some ambitions of progress which it forces itself to realize, and the smallest article of which the good people are incapable of comprehending. It is just under the rule of opinion that they avoid the exact opinion of electors, and that the *referendum* is held in suspicion, when logically it ought to be the first institution of democracy. But when the government sees a squall, when opinion scrutinizes, asserts itself, accumulates and precipitates itself like a torrent, then it abandons itself to the current, anxious only to retain its place, waits to learn what will happen and how things will turn out, at the risk of shipwrecking the country. The last year we saw this same public opinion recall the envoy of Admiral Camara and his squadron, without any strategic reason and contrary to all the intentions of government. In truth a singular neglect of the interests of the state is necessary to applaud democracy as a government of opinion.

3. Finally, democratic government is no better organized than any other government for the safeguarding of individual rights; and, what is worse, it is by its institutions less organized to effectively protect them. The democratic régime, especially when it is parliamentary, rests on a series of antinomies which tend to crush the individual, and even to negative the advantages which are the *raison d'être* of any system. We know how majorities insolently suppress the rights of minorities. In Canada, *e. g.*, the English had to admit that if the privy council of the queen had not intervened to render justice to the Catholics in the matter of the schools of Manitoba, the majority parliament of Ottawa would never have recognized their wrongs. If, therefore, parliaments, to be honest, must see themselves subjected to paramount tutelage, we have a right to ask: Of what use is democracy, and what is really democratic in the matter? However, what we desire to emphasize is not that the caprice of the majority can do wrong to the minority, for when even the caprices multiply and succeed each other indefinitely, democracy can always hope and maintain that some day the progress of education will bring about the end. No, that which is striking in democracy is that it neither allows nor can allow the redress of wrongs of the government toward the individual. We believe, firmly, that with only a little study of popular government under its various phases, and with perfect disinterestedness, one will always conclude that it is a vast mystification; that it rests on a series of misunderstandings, deceptions, antinomies, hypocrisies, childish vanities. That it has not already fallen under public contempt is due to the fact that politics has not the importance in the life of the people which politicians and men of letters, who are directly concerned, pretend. No one can predict the destiny of democracy. It gains ground every day. The more it commits faults within, the more it seems to obtain adherence without in the countries where it rules; as if it was unwilling to look at the delusive side of these deeds and heroic achievements. The kings and emperors who still rule seem to retain a precarious authority, and are only playing with a power whose hours are numbered. It is possible that democracy will prevail in all the territories of our civilization. In France, notably, the cycle of the old monarchies, of the kind that neither the royalty of the Bourbons nor the empire of the Bonapartes can resuscitate, seems closed. But we need not grant that democracy ought to be established in the world. We do not admit that in the perpetual changes in the eternal growth of things, the one only definitive, immutable institution should be the most irrational, the most unskillful of all; that which subsists only by force of pretentious sophisms and artful expedients, contrary to its very principle. We are forcibly persuaded that democracy will have its end; that it will terrify all living interests and all respectable rights, if it pushes its doctrines to their limit, or if it disengages the greater part of its energies by indifference; if it rests secure in a happy satisfaction or only occupies itself in vainly playing with power. Everything has its normal end in this world, and it is infinitely probable that we shall one day see flourishing again new dynasties which will begin with Cæsarism or tyranny, such as we see in antiquity and revived in the fifteenth century. The peoples will then have a new period of monarchy, which will probably be followed by a new awakening of democratic aspirations; or they will

give advantages to popular government which it has not in reality; or they will forget the examples of today, as we forget those of former times; for, of all memories, the shortest is the political. I refuse to believe that a form of government of which we say so much evil with justice, in an age of freedom, will be the best and last effort of humanity in the matter of politics.—RENÉ DE KERALLAIN, "La Démocratie," in *La Réforme sociale*, June 16, 1899.

Progress of the Socialist Spirit in France.

I.

Recent writers upon the socialist movement, being interested particularly in the action of its leaders, have left the bottom of the question untouched. Interest has centered upon results and passing phases rather than upon causes. But socialism is not the product of the imagination of single leaders more or less deluded, but a widespread social force—an idea of voluntary organization—arising with the modern modes of production and exchange, and with the political and humanitarian doctrines of the French Revolution.

There are three inseparable elements in the movement:

1. The struggle of the proletariat for economic autonomy. This is the basis of all socialism.

2. The struggle of the proletariat for political power.

3. The spread of the general doctrines of human rights promulgated by the theorists.

It is especially in the severe economic and moral conditions of the life of the proletariat that the terms of the socialist problem are located.

II.

In the sixteenth century the workmen of certain industries, in order to escape the burdensome regulations of their masters and wardens, began to form special societies, which had neither legal nor religious nor social sanction, and were therefore revolutionary.

The members of these organizations did not understand how to maintain themselves in their associations, being constantly engaged in stupid hostilities toward other similar groups. But these were the foreshadowings of the bourgeoisie.

Of these growing shadows the legislature of 1791 seems to have had an exaggerated fear, passing a law abolishing such corporations. The law, *Le Chapelier*, prohibited all association and coöperation among workmen for the purpose of protecting their own interests, on the ground that such association was an infringement of the liberties of the *entrepreneurs*, and thus the movement toward autonomy in the labor world was arrested.

In a study entitled *Le Mouvement syndical*, M. Bourdeau says: "It [the Revolution] had made the workman free, but it condemned him to isolation, prevented him from associating, and from voluntarily limiting his liberty; between the individual and the strongly centralized government it tolerated no organized force. And this state of affairs has tended to maintain in France the spirit of revolution."

The workmen of the Revolution always conceived of the republic as an exclusively political régime; they never comprehended that direct action of the proletariat with a view to social reforms could exist aside from political action of the whole people. Revolutionary Jacobinism had taken the position that there could be no such thing as autonomous labor organization. But the economic difficulties becoming serious, and obliging them to rely upon themselves for the securing of their immediate interests, the democratic and republican ideas came, thenceforth, to inspire them in their efforts to ameliorate their lot, or, if need be, radically to change the situation.

In the insurrections of Lyons of 1831 and 1834 the conflicts between capital and labor for the first time issued in bloodshed, the causes of which were decidedly economic. Since 1830 the growing activity of the workmen in favor of the republic, the increase in the number of socialist writers, and the tendency of the proletariat to

organize itself as a homogeneous force with the purpose of establishing a new economic order, are manifest in many ways.

Communism is the alpha and omega of socialism. It is the doctrine which is most easily comprehended among its advocates. In 1848 communism was very much in favor among the workmen of Paris and Lyons.

About 1864, articles 414 to 416 of the penal code were modified to allow labor associations; and it was shortly before this that the international labor movement was started. The effort was for the enfranchisement of the workmen by the workmen themselves. In 1869 and 1870 the International began to have considerable influence both in political action and in propagandist theories.

Since the labor congress of Paris in 1876, that of Lyons in 1878, and that of Marseilles in 1879, a new aspect of the movement appears, viz., a struggle of the workmen for *moral* autonomy. The members of the proletariat were becoming more *conscious* of their interests and of the whole social situation.

III.

Today those who think that the socialists are concerned wholly with state action deceive themselves. The socialists believe also in the possibility of establishing a new general social order arising directly from their deliberations, which will be of a different character and have different powers from the actual state, and which will succeed it naturally at a given time. The truth is that through all the proletariat the idea of a general social reform is spreading, and finding representatives (1) in the syndicates, (2) in the parties organized for propagandist and electioneering purposes, and (3) in an unorganized party which makes itself felt only at times of elections.

At the socialist meetings and special conventions are discussed today, with considerable amity and tolerance, such questions as the remedy for involuntary idleness, the means for assuring work for all, for securing the eight-hour day, the right of association and of labor insurance, and for establishing a minimum living wage. And these questions represent not merely differences between workmen and employers, but social facts which interest and disquiet the whole world.

IV.

The socialist parties organized at Paris and in the province for propagandist and electoral purposes have modified, to any considerable extent, only their general spirit and the direction of their forces. These parties are four in number:

1. The French Labor Party, called somewhat erroneously "collectivist," inspired by Karl Marx and led by M. Jules Guesde and M. Paul Lafargue.

2. The Revolutionary Socialist Labor Party, which openly declares itself communistic, and considers political action only a propagandist means. This party is led by M. Allemane.

3. The Federation of Socialist Workmen of France, which professes the same principles as the Revolutionary Socialist Labor Party, but which hopes to gain through political action certain reforms, looking toward the performance, by the state or by the commune, of all the great public services.

4. The Revolutionary Socialist Party, which has taken the name recently, and consists of groups which rally around the Central Revolutionary Committee. They are inspired by the communistic spirit, disdaining to analyze economic facts and make theoretic definitions, but are rather an extreme republican than a strictly socialist party. They are led by M. Blanqui and M. Vaillant.

V.

These various factions fight each other vigorously, though, perhaps, not so stupidly as did the former groups at the beginning of the movement. Each considers itself orthodox and the others as schismatic. A superficial movement toward union, having its center in Parliament rather than in the parties, and called the Socialist Union, has thus far proved somewhat abortive. But in June, 1898, the Revolutionary Socialist

Labor Party nominated a commission of six members, charged to represent it in a general socialist conference. A little later the other parties took similar measures. The first general conference took place on November 20, 1898, and the following three resolutions were adopted:

"1. That there is need of substituting for the provisional representation, such as the committee of vigilance [organized the previous month], a permanent body representing all the socialist organizations which are constituted on national lines.

"2. The independent socialists are invited to organize into a national federation, to be represented on the future committee of federation of the socialist organizations.

"3. Nothing shall be modified in the organization and working of the separate socialist bodies."

In December, 1898, the permanent committee was formed upon the following principles (somewhat similar to those of the federation of the American colonies):

"1. Nothing shall be modified in the internal working of the contracting organizations which shall not first be approved by their respective delegates. . . . The delegates shall seek for a general agreement in the solution of each question, but each organization shall remain unbound by their decision.

"2. Each of the five organizations shall be represented in the central union by seven delegates regularly commissioned."

At the session January 15, 1899, the national federation of the independents was consummated and took part in the common deliberations, which were marked by much good will, tact, and courtesy. And a great international socialist congress has now been planned for 1900, to be held at Berlin.

The supreme inspiration of the socialist movement is that the proletariat—the great body of the people—has but one consciousness, one will, one set of interests, one common end, and that a new phase of social coöperation must succeed that of clashing individual interests.—ALBERT RICHARD, "La Marche de l'Esprit socialiste en France," in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, July 10, 1899.